As
also saith the law
“So
speak ye, and so do, as they that shall be judged
by the law of liberty.” - James 2:12
- “A function
of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute.
It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition
of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are,
or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and
challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and
have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance
of an idea. That is why freedom of speech...is...protected against
censorship or punishment...There is no room under our Constitution
for a more restrictive view” (Terminiello v. City
of Chicago, 337US 1 (1949( at 3-5).
- “The
fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient
reason for suppressing it. Indeed, if it is the speaker’s
opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for according
it Constitutional protection.” Simon & Shuster,
Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 118 (1991). See also Forsyth County v. Nationalist
Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134-35 (1992)/ Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at
210/ Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,21 (1971).
- “Leafleting,
sign display, and oral communications are protected by the First
Amendment.” Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 715
(2000).
- “It
is well settled that a municipality cannot place content-based
restrictions on the protected exercise of speech.”
Deborah Kay Anderson et al v. Charter Township of Plymouth, Michigan,
et al, USDC CN.02-73056 in order granting Preliminary
Injunction.
- “The
fact that the messages conveyed by [leafleting, sign displays
and oral communications] may be offensive to their recipients
does not deprive them of constitutional protection.” Glasson
v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899, 904 (6th Cir 1975).
- “We
have repeatedly referred to public streets as the archetype of
a traditional public forum.” Frisby v. Schultz,
487 U.S. 474, 479 (1988).
- “Offended
viewers can ‘effectively avoid further bombardment of their
sensibilities simply by averting their eyes.” Hill
v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 715 (2000).
- “Wherever
the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially
been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of
mind, have been used for purpose of assembly, communicating thoughts
between citizens, and discussing public questions.” Hague
v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 at 515 (1939).
- “Our
decisions establish that mere public intolerance or animosity
cannot be the basis for abridgement of these constitutional freedoms...The
First and Fourteenth Amendments do not permit a state to make
criminal the exercise of the right to assembly simply because
its exercise may be “annoying” to some people.”
Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 91 S.Ct. 1686,
1689 (1921).
- “Reasonable
time, place and manner restrictions on free expression and their
enforcement cannot be based on speech thereby restricted.”
Davenport v. City of Alexandria, Virginia 683 F.2d 853,
on rehearing 710 F.2d. 148.
- “Indeed
there was once a time in this country when a minister, whose voice
would not have carried for a greater distance than two city blocks,
would certainly have been accepted with greatly restrained enthusiasm,
and most likely would have been regarded even by his most faithful
parishioners, as a downright failure in the ministry.”
City of Louisiana v. Bottoms, 300 S.W. 316 (Mo.1927) at 318.
- “The
right to speak carries the right to be heard...Freedom to be heard
is as vital to freedom of speech, as is freedom to circulate is
to freedom of press...[When] the right to be heard is placed in
the uncontrolled discretion of the Chief of Police...He stands
athwart the channels of communication as an obstruction which
can be removed only after criminal trial and conviction and lengthy
appeal. A more effective previous restraint is difficult to imagine.”
Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 559.
- · “Freedom
of speech is protected against censorship or punishment unless
shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious
substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance,
or unrest...There is not room under our Constitution for a more
restrictive view.” Edwards v. South Carolina, 372
U.S. 229 (1963) at 703.
- “Noise
can be regulated by regulating decibels.” Saia v.
New York, 334 U.S. 1943.
- [For Pennsylvania
Use] “Civil law may, at times, give way to religious beliefs.”
Commonwealth v. Barnhart, 345 Pa. Supp. Ct. 9.
- “The prohibition
of noise per se is unconstitutional.” Edwards
v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 83 S. Ct. 680/ Gardner
v. Ceci, 312 F. 2d. 516.
- “City
ordinance which, inter alia, prohibited ‘loud’ and
‘boisterous’ language is unconstitutional.”
Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229/ Landry
v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 968.
- “The right
to speak carries the right to be heard.” Saia v. New York,
334 U.S. 559.
- “Freedom
to be heard is as vital to freedom of speech, as is freedom to
circulate is to freedom of press.” Saia v. New York,
334 U.S. 1943/ Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444.
- “Thus
[an] ordinance is vague, not in the sense that it requires a person
to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative
standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct
is specified at all.” Coates v. Cincinnati, 402
U.S. 611, 91 S. Ct. 1686.
- “The ordinance
also proscribes conduct that tends to disturb or annoy. The language
of the ordinance is both vague and overbroad. The constitutionally
protected exercise of free speech frequently causes a disturbance,
for the very purpose of the First Amendment is to stimulate the
creation and communication of new, and therefore often controversial
ideas. The prohibition against conduct that tends to disturb another
would literally make it a crime to deliver an unpopular speech
that resulted in a disturbance. Such a restriction is a clearly
invalid restriction of constitutionally protected free expression.”
Gardner v. Ceci, 312 F2d. 516/ Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 968.
- “Annoyance
at ideas can be cloaked in annoyance at sound.” Saia
v. New York, 334 U.S. 562.
- “The phrases
leave determination of what is legal behavior to the unfettered
and arbitrary discretion of the individual “person in authority”,
and is unconstitutionally broad.” Shuttleworth v.
city of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147/ 89 S. Ct. 935/ Gardner v. Ceci,
312 F2d. 516.
- “A clear
and precise enactment may nevertheless be “overbroad”
if in its reach it prohibits constitutionally protected conduct.”
Grayned v. city of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92 S. Ct. 294.
- “The native
power of human speech can interfere little with the self-protection
of those who do not wish to listen.” Saia v. New
York, 334 U.S. 558, 568.
- “The fact
that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason
for suppressing it. Indeed, if it is the speaker’s opinion
that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for according
it Constitutional protection.” Simon & Shuster,
Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 118 (1991). See also Forsyth County v. Nationalist
Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134-35 (1992)/ Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at
210/ Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,21 (1971).
- “Leafleting,
sign display, and oral communications are protected by the First
Amendment.” Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703,
715 (2000).
- “The fact
that the messages conveyed by [leafleting, sign displays and oral
communications] may be offensive to their recipients does not
deprive them of constitutional protection.” Glasson
v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899, 904
(6th Cir 1975).
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